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AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT
OF
THE INELIMINABLE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
T.A. CAVANAUGH
In this paper, I present what, for the moment, I will call Aquinas’s account of private property. I
hesitate so to name his account, for, it will become evident that Aquinas offers a conception of
private property that differs significantly from current usage. For example, Thomas maintains
that a needy person has a claim in justice to the abundance others possess. He holds that a needy
person who takes from the abundance of another in order to satisfy his own urgent, manifest,
unmet need does not steal, for he takes what belongs to him insofar as the goods of the earth are
ordained to satisfying human need generally (S.t. IIaIIae, q.66, a. 7 and IIaIIae, q. 64, a.1). Thus,
Thomas understands private property to have an ineradicable social dimension. In what follows,
we will, first, briefly survey the standard contemporary account and its justificatory difficulty.
Second, present Aquinas’s account, and finally, conclude with a number of practical reflections.

THE STANDARD CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNT
In a recent survey of private property’s conceptual topography, Jeremy Waldron notes:
The person to whom a given object is assigned by the principles of private
property ... has control over the object: it is for her to decide what should
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be done with it. In exercising this authority, she is not understood to be
acting as an agent or official of the society. Instead, we say that the
resource is her property; it belongs to her; she is its owner; it is as much
hers as her arms and legs, kidneys and corneas. ... [H]er right to decide as
she pleases applies whether or not others are affected by her decision
(Waldron, p. 6, original emphasis, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law
and Legal Theory, 1996, ed. by Dennis Patterson, Cambridge:Blackwell
Publishers)
Further analyzing the standard conceptualization of private property, Waldron states:
[A]n individual’s right to make decisions about the use of a thing has two
elements. First, ... it implies the absence of any obligation to use or refrain
from using the object in any particular way. The owner may decide as she
pleases and she is at liberty to put her decision into effect by occupying,
using, modifying, perhaps even consuming or destroying the object.
Second, private property implies that other people do not have this liberty;
they do have an obligation -- an obligation to the owner -- to refrain from
occupying, using, modifying, consuming, or destroying the object
(Waldron, p. 7, original emphasis).
Waldron finds private property conceived as an obligation-less exclusion of others from the
enjoyment of what is one’s own that incorporates others’ obligations to leave alone one’s own
things -- which are taken to be comparable to one’s organs.
THE PROBLEM OF JUSTIFICATION
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This account, however, faces a significant normative, justificatory difficulty. Indeed,
those who propose the conception Waldron outlines are acutely aware of the difficulty of
justifying private property so conceived. Waldron articulates the problem:
[W]e look for a justification of private property, because it deprives the
community of control over resources which may be important to the
well-being of its members, and because it characteristically requires us to
throw social force behind the exclusion of many members of our society
from each and every use of the resources they need in order to live. ...
[R]esources may gradually come to be distributed in a way that leaves a
few with a lot, a lot with a very little, and a considerable number with
nothing at all. Private property involves a pledge by society that it will
continue to use its moral and physical authority to uphold the rights of
owners, even against those who have no employment, no food to eat, no
home to go to, no land to stand on from which they are not at any time
liable to be evicted (Waldron, p. 9)
Clearly, if one has an abundance of life’s necessities and others are in dire need of them, one’s
exclusion of them from what they need in order to survive requires significant justification. Yet,
in terms of what standard could one justify such a social institution? If one were to attempt to
justify private property so conceived in terms of the greater good of the greater number, one
would -- at least on the face of things -- fall short of facing the specific problem noted by
Waldron. For the point of that problem is that massive quantities of property -- and its most
significant manifestation, capital -- tend to be concentrated in the hands of a very small minority.
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[FOOTNOTE 1: As Waldron notes, John Locke, who faced this difficulty, thought that the
convention of money both allowed some to accumulate significantly more than others and
justified their accumulation, for he understood money to express a society’s agreement to some
having much more than others.] One might resort to claims of efficiency, that this concentration
of property in the hands of a few actually increases the welfare of all. Yet, such a claim fails to
meet the demand on two counts. First, it is asserted that some lack what they need in order to
survive (and, certainly, some do lack these basic resources while many more lack what they need
in order to flourish). How is private property of benefit to them? Second, there is no reason to
think that efficiency could not be just as readily served by amassing great quantities of property
in the hands of a few non-owning managers, as do publicly traded corporations and large pension
and mutual funds. Trying another tack, one might justify excluding those in dire need from the
use of what others possess in abundance by asserting that those who do not have what they need
in order to survive are no worse off simply because others have more than what they need in
order to survive and flourish. [FOOTNOTE 2: What economists classically refer to as a Pareto
improvement.] Yet, this response also misses the justificatory demand, for the problem is why
ought those who do not have what they need in order to survive refrain from taking the
abundance of others? The most realistic answer asserts what is no doubt usually true: those who
do not have what they direly need are in no position to threaten the superabundance of others.
This response, however, asserts might; it does not make might right.
THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM: CONCEPTUAL DUALISM
Conceived as the exclusion of some from what they need in order to survive, private
property is not readily justified if those in dire need are excluded from what others possess in
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abundance, after their own basic needs have been met. Indeed, one suspects that in facing this
justificatory problem what one in fact faces is the more deep-seated problem of conceptual
dualism that plagues much of contemporary Anglophone philosophy. To see this, we can merely
recount the path to the problem of justification. First, others were conceptually excluded from
the enjoyment of things they need and, under threat of coercion, required to honor their own
exclusion; second, a justification for this coerced exclusion was sought; yet, none was
forthcoming. The final resolution of this problem will be to find private property a contingent,
yet ineliminable fact of our existence, or the only viable way of handling property, or the way
that most recently won out. These responses, however, manifest the hallmark of most problems
generated by conceptual dichotomies: they leave the intellect dissatisfied by asserting that the
way things are just is, inexplicably, the way things are. Take, for example, the dichotomy of
conceptual dichotomies, the mind-body problem. To generate the mind-body problem, define the
mind and body as utterly distinct and independent of one another; second, note that the mind and
body have a close, intimate, inimitable association with one another, to the point that the mind
exerts occult causal influences on the body and vice-versa. Third, note that this salient
association of mind and body is conceptually inexplicable, leading one, perhaps, to deny the
existence of mind or to assert that this relationship is just the way things, serendipitously, are. Or,
for a derivative and less celebrated instance of a conceptual dichotomy, taking billiard balls and
other efficient causes as the only type of causality, and noting that reasons certainly do seem to
be causes for human action, which is in turn defined as a spatio-temporal movement of body
parts, it is asked how a reason, a mental entity, can cause a local motion? Not being a billiard ball
or even billiard ball-like, a reason cannot be a billiard-ball-like cause of an action. [FOOTNOTE
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3:For an account in which reasons are serendipitous causes of actions, see Davidson; Actions,
Reasons, Causes in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1980.] Therefore,
reasons cannot be causes though every sane man treat them as if they were. The point, hopefully
not lost in these examples, is that insoluble philosophical problems often depend on faulty
conceptions that divide what obviously belong together -- soul and body, motive and action,
bread and the satisfaction of human hunger.
The specific point with respect to the exclusionary conception of private property is that
such a conception, by needlessly introducing a dichotomy between what one possesses and
others’ claims to that which they urgently need, generates the unmeetable demand for justifying
some having a tremendous amount of the goods of this earth while others lack what they need in
order to survive. How could one justify sustaining one man’s possession of a full granary in the
face of a starving human being or village? One cannot. Any justification would either have to
deny the problem or show itself to be morally bankrupt.

AQUINAS’S ACCOUNT
Setting aside the exclusionary conception of private property, let us investigate that
conception proposed by Aquinas; namely, the conception of property as being possessed
privately, yet at root always ordered towards common use, or the private possession/common use
account of property. At the outset, let us note that Aquinas follows and develops Aristotle’s
account and the positions of, amongst others, Ambrose and Basil. Moreover, Catholic Social
teaching as found in documents such as Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum (111-113), Pius XI’s
Quadregesimo Anno (191), John XXIII’s Mater et Magistra (428-429), Paul VI’s

6

Populorum Progressio (22-24) and John Paul II’s Centesimus Annus (Ch. IV) consistently
employ this private possession/common use (or universal destination) account of property.
Following Aristotle (e.g., Politics, II. 5, 1263 a 40) Thomas distinguishes the possession
of property from the use of property. He offers three allied reasons for the social institution of
private individuals possessing and controlling property (S.t IIAIIAE, q. 66, a.2) That is, for their
acquiring, holding and distributing things. First, he notes what has come to be called the
“Tragedy of the Commons” argument: that where people hold things commonly, the common lot
suffers. On the other hand, where each has his own, individuals are more solicitous for the care
of what they can call “mine”. [FOOTNOTE 4: For this same argument, see, e.g., Waldron, p. 11]
Thomas asks us to imagine a house with many servants in which the common work goes undone
(perhaps a memory of his boyhood at Rocca Secca), or we might reflect on the “family” garden
going unweeded, or envision the myriad papers scattered in the entrances of non-owner
occupied triplexes. Second, Thomas notes that, regardless of the narrowness of fallen human
self-interest, where things are not assigned to individuals, there arises a practically inefficient
disorder and confusion concerning precisely who should care for exactly what. Finally, he offers
what one might call the “good fences make good neighbors” argument; he says that private
property makes for a more pacific republic in which each can be contented with what he can with
clarity call his own.
In short, Thomas understands private property to be a natural and practically intelligent
way of holding things. He does not -- as many thinkers do -- pre-occupy himself with the
criterion of initial distribution, how property is first assigned to the possession of individuals, for
example, by discovery, occupation, or work. This is not to say that he or the tradition of which he
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is a part is indifferent to the issue of how we determine who gets what. This issue, however, is
relatively moot in Aquinas’ account, for regardless of how we decide to assign property to the
possession of private individuals, the issue of the use and point of property is ineradicably rooted
in natures, and this brings us to the heart of Thomas’s account: the goal-oriented character of
things and of our possession of things.
THE ENDS OF THINGS
With respect to the use, consumption, or enjoyment of property, Thomas holds that while
property ought to be held individually, it is always by its very nature primarily ordered towards a
common use, namely, to meeting the needs of human nature, regardless of who possesses it.
Thomas offers reasons taken from sacred theology as well as secular philosophy. Let us attend to
the philosophical grounds. In answering the question whether it is licit for men to possess things
(S.t., IIAIIAE, q. 66, a. 1.), Thomas refers to an earlier question concerning the killing of plants
and animals (S.t, IIAIIAE, q. 64, a.1). In that earlier question he argues that because we are
higher beings than plants and animals, we may kill and eat plants and animals. Moreover,
because animals are higher beings than plants, we may kill plants and feed them to animals.
Thomas understands humans to have the abilities to domesticate, dominate, kill and eat
plants and animals because our nature is higher than those of plants and animals and plants and
animals are ordered towards sustaining human life. Thus, to be counted amongst its excellences
is a plant’s or an animal’s edibility by humans. There are, of course, innumerable other ends of
edible things, for example, to sustain themselves in being, to pollinate flowers, to make soil, to
fly, to swim, or to display beauty (as Gerard Manley Hopkins says: “Kingfishers catch fire,
dragonflies draw flame... each mortal thing does one thing and the same: selves goes itself,
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myself it speaks and spells, saying what I do is me, for this I came”). Even as food living things
serve ends other than the mere sustenance of human life. For example, food serves the ends of
human flourishing, conviviality and sociability. In Aquinas’s account of property possession, the
basic end of human survival and the higher ends of human flourishing are connected. For now,
however, let us focus on the basic end of human survival as it indicates, most radically, the point
and justification of consuming things, one of the more profound instances of the use of a thing.
Can one argue that plants and animals are ordered towards sustaining human life and not
merely capable of sustaining human life? Most of us unreflectively eat what is put before us; we
do not bother to justify our eating and indirectly killing peas and carrots or chickens and pigs. If
we were to offer a justification for our eating these other living beings, we might rely solely on
our ability to do so. In accordance with such a justification, being “higher” on the food chain
would simply mean being able to kill and eat other beings that are, lacking such a power over
humans, “lower” on the food chain. Yet, given such a justification, what would be wrong with an
animal’s killing and eating a human being? why ought we not feed animals human flesh? Or why
ought we not kill and eat other humans?
Taking the issue of cannibalism, it is, fortunately, normally not necessary and it would
usually be a great inconvenience to kill and eat other human beings. Moreover, being human
beings we might generally oppose the killing and eating of humans, at the very least out of
enlightened self-interest. Such responses, however, would have us hold that killing and eating
other humans is merely ill-advised, inconvenient, disagreeable, or generally unnecessary. It is
not, however, for such reasons that we ought not to kill and eat other human beings. We ought
not to do so because they are beings of reason and will, who apprehend and direct themselves
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towards the enjoyment of what is good. It is for this very reason that we may kill and eat animals
and plants, because while we do, they do not apprehend the good nor direct themselves towards
it. We humans are higher, more perfect, better beings than plants and animals. Thus, when we
kill and eat plants and animals, plants and animals achieve a better level of existence by serving
higher, human ends. The carrot and the rabbit fuel thought and thereby participate in a level of
existence far surpassing that of a root or a rodent. The crushed grape serves human sociability
and thereby rises above its own limits. When lower things serve our needs, they become more
perfect and realize a level of being far above that of their entire species. On the other hand, if a
human were eaten by, for example, a Bengal tiger, this order would be reversed. For, even if
Bengal tigers were to become extinct if one tiger did not happen to eat a human being,
nevertheless, human flesh that supports thought and will would thereby be reduced to sensation
and perception, at best. The more perfect would have been subordinated to the less perfect and
this ought not to be. Thus, Thomas justifies the most profound use of things, consumption, in
terms of the hierarchical relationship between the natures of things and human nature. To the
extent to which a justification for eating plants and animals rises above the superficial claim that
it is okay to eat them because we can, that justification tends towards the hierarchy-of-natures
account that Thomas offers. In terms of such an account one can indeed argue that plants and
animals are ordered towards sustaining human life.
At the outset of this paper, hoping to capture your attention, I noted that Thomas holds
that were a man’s basic needs to go unmet in a manifest way, such that others who had an
abundance of the earth’s goods did not voluntarily give to him what he needed, he could take
what he needed in order to survive from their abundance, for this belonged to him. This position
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follows from Thomas’s justification of the most profound and total form of use, eating. By
justifying the consumption of things in terms of the hierarchical relation between human and
non-human natures, Aquinas grounds his claim that urgent, unmet, manifest need makes things
common. For possession, insofar as it is a means to use does not eradicate this order of natures
upon which use is based. Moreover, possession itself clearly is a means to use. It is perverse to
have simply to have and we recognize this by wanting to have for the sake of something better
than having, namely, for the sake of using. Thus, insofar as use is grounded in human nature’s
need, and possession is ordered towards use, human need always “trumps” possession, or the just
limits of one man’s abundance are to be defined by his neighbor’s needs.
Of course, just as food is not solely for nutrition, so also, possession is not solely for
meeting basic needs, it also enables us to flourish, and this brings us to a consideration of the role
of virtue and its relation to the use of possessions in Thomas’s account. Earlier we spoke of
things serving basic human needs and ends, and of things serving higher human ends, or more
generally, of things serving human flourishing. In Aquinas’s account, virtues transform one
man’s basic human need into another man’s opportunity to achieve perfection, or to flourish
through the exercise of virtues such as justice and generosity.
The virtues of distributive justice and generosity at once depend upon things being
possessed privately and serve as the stimuli by which deeds make use common. For Thomas,
following Aristotle, understands man to control property, in part, in order to have something to
share and to give to others. Were property not under the control of private individuals, the
purview of the virtues of generosity and distributive justice would be unduly constrained, for few
avenues would be open to the private individual to exercise these human perfections and, thereby
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to flourish as a human being. Moreover, for Aquinas’s account of common use to bear fruit in
the relief of those not possessing property, the human perfections of generosity, magnanimity,
and justice must be realized in the actions of those who possess an abundance of property.
Aristotle himself alludes to this when he says:
[I]t is better for possessions to be privately owned, but to make them
common property in use; and to train the citizens to this is the special task
of the legislator (Politics, 1263a40).
While avoiding the justificatory difficulty facing the exclusionary accounts of private property ,
this private possession/common use account faces the difficulty of making men good, and
depends upon a society dedicated to producing citizens who, possessing abundance, understand
themselves to be perfected by their speedy and voluntary distribution to those in need. Indeed,
one further reason Thomas offers for the individual’s possession of things is so that he may
speedily and easily (facile) communicate them to others in need (S.t.., IIAIIAE, q. 66, a.2).
Let us conclude on what may be called a practical-theoretical note, or on the practicality
of theory. What needs to be done in order to realize something like the
private-possession/common use account of property? It is tempting to think in terms of
institutions, tax schemes, social welfare programs, or tithing. Such temptations ought to be
avoided, however, at least as initial answers. For what we need most is re-conceptualization, not
programs or processes. For these inevitably follow from an understanding of what we as human
beings are and what it means for us to be better human beings. We must re-apprehend ourselves
as the highest natured beings in a world of natured beings. With respect to other human beings
we must come to know and think of ourselves as genetically social beings, naturally from, with,
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and for others. Beings who think of themselves as, of course, watching out for others. Beings
who think of themselves as, of course, having wide and deep social goals. No tax scheme can do
this for us. Nor could any institution realize Aquinas’s account while hampered, as present
institutions are, with an adversarial, autonomous-man account of what a human is, an account
that claims that human togetherness and society is an artifice whereby we rise above a nature that
is “red in tooth and claw in ravine.” The task is two-fold: first, to clean our contemporary
conceptual stables of the detritus that has come to litter them; second, to present an account of
man’s nature that keeps together what must be kept together, the one and the many and the
strong and the weak.
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